Introduction
Long, long ago, in an economy far away, decisionmakers responsible for maintaining the footings of commerce faced a troubling question: should entrenched property rights, manifested in a publicly chartered bridge franchise, be permitted to stand in the way of a new bridge, to compete directly with the established one? The question as posed pitted two important public policies -the sanctity of public charters and the imperative of technological progress -against each other in stark, unavoidable fashion.
The case was resolved, ultimately, by the Supreme Court. In a narrow legal sense, the case rejected the notion that a state-chartered corporation received a perpetual exclusive franchise to operate bridges over the Charles in Boston. But in a wider sense, the case issued a clear, sweeping verdict: competition wins out, over established franchises, over old money, over political influence. The Charles River Bridge case, 1 as it was known, reverberated through the Jacksonian era, and still carries weight to this day.
1 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
5 game cartridge sellers to prevent the sale of competing cartridges by "unauthorized"
competitors. Tiny lock-out codes were the key to the entire market, in other words.
Again and again the courts in these cases rebelled against the idea that a thin property right (copyright) in a short sequence of code could be used to prevent competition in a large market -the market for console-compatible game cartridges. Copying short program sequences has been held protected by the fair use defense in these cases.
These cases fit neatly into the general principle of interoperability. The same principle was at work in the First Circuit opinion in Lotus v. Borland. 4 Here the issue was copyrightability -in particular, whether Lotus could assert enforceable copyrights over the menu command structure for its popular 1-2-3 spreadsheet application program. The court decided it could not, and was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. The court emphasized users' significant expenditure of time and money, and spoke of not permitting Lotus to hold these investments "captive." The opinion thus serves as a prime example of the second strand of the interoperability principle, "user holdup."
The growing caselaw on copyright misuse is mostly about interoperability. Under this heading, courts have refused to enforce agreements (and copyrights underlying them) when licensors are seen as impermissibly leveraging copyrights. Consider a recent example, Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technology., Inc. 5 This is one of a series of cases considering whether copyright in a digital phone switch operating system could be asserted in a way to prevent competitors from designing and introducing competing switches. Following other recent cases, 6 the Alcatel court said no, and in the process articulated nicely the concept of disproportionate leverage:
4 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) .
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Any competing microprocessor card developed for use on DSC phone switches must be compatible with DSC's copyrighted operating system software. In order to ensure that its card is compatible, a competitor such as DGI must test the card on a DSC phone switch. Such a test necessarily involves making a copy of DSC's copyrighted operating system, which copy is downloaded into the card's memory when the card is booted up. If DSC is allowed to prevent such copying, then it can prevent anyone from developing a competing microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card.
Under these facts, DSC's assertion that its licensing agreement does not prohibit the independent development of compatible software is simply irrelevant.
Despite the presence of some evidence --the testimony of a DSC executive --that DGI could have developed its own software, there was also evidence that it was not technically feasible to use a non-DSC operating system because the switch has a "common control" scheme in which each microprocessor card in a network of such cards runs the same operating system. Hence, without the freedom to test its cards in conjunction with DSC's software, DGI was effectively prevented from developing its product, thereby securing for DSC a limited monopoly over its uncopyrighted microprocessor cards . . . .
The cases dealing with telecommunications are based doctrinally in the law of copyright misuse. The crux of the cases lies in agreements between operating system suppliers and their licensees. Nevertheless, the similarity to the game cartridge cases is evident. In both sets of cases, courts frame the issue as whether copyright in one "software" component of a standardized product could be used to control the market for the entire system -i.e., for a hardware/software combination that constitutes the total product. In each case courts have answered no. A consistent rationale can be teased out of the disparate opinions: a "little copyright" may not be used to control a "big market."
In a nutshell, this is what I mean by the principle of "disproportionate leverage." It may 7 be considered a consistent application of the basic premise, articulated in the foundational copyright misuse case of Lasercomb v. Reynolds, 7 which concluded that licensing agreements would not be enforced "in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright." 8 As indicated earlier, the "public policy" behind the principle of disproportionate leverage is the encouragement of interoperability in standards-driven markets.
The nascent principle of disproportionate leverage finds voice in other cases as well. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found copyright misuse recently in an exclusive agreement between the American Medical Association and the federal government's Health Care Financing Agency. 9 The agreement adopted the AMA's procedure code book as the standard coding system for medical billing and accounting.
Although rejecting the sweeping conclusion that copyrights in codes that have become standards are per se unenforceable, the court did rely on the "substantial and unfair
advantage" the exclusivity agreement conferred on the AMA's codes.
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At the same time, it is far too early to tell whether the nascent pro-interoperability trend will endure, and if so, what its final contours will be. Stated in terms of this principle, the issue in several recent cases dealing with after-market service arrangements 7 911 F.2d 970 (4 th Cir. 1990 ). 8 Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977. 9 Practice Management Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9 th Cir. 1997), modified . 10 AMA, 121 F.3d at 521:
The adverse effects of the licensing agreement are apparent. The terms under which the AMA agreed to license use of the [code book] to HCFA gave the AMA a substantial and unfair advantage over its competitors.
The court did not expand on its holding, which leaves in doubt the circumstances under which a "tie-out" agreement involving a copyrighted work is enforceable in the Ninth Circuit. Here we find Judge Boudin arguing that the efforts of the users in learning a new work, such as the computer protocol in the example above, rather than the efforts of the creator in designing the work, account for the success of these kinds of works. It follows from this that the claims of the work's creator must give way to those of the users in some cases.
Technological Standards and Human Capital Investments
This logic is developed in the following passage, drawn from an article applying to intellectual property law the labor-oriented property rights theory of philosopher John 14 And so with other areas as well, in particular the amorphous but important doctrine of "misappropriation." 15 Typically, the labor that intellectual property recognizes is the labor of a work's creator: the author of the protected work. With a few exceptions -e.g., the early videogame cases, where courts struggled with the concept that a video game player in some sense "coauthors" the game's individualized audiovisual experience -the law of intellectual property has no trouble identifying the "author" whose extensive labor must be protected.
But notice the countertrend in the area of standards. In the copyright interoperability cases, in particular Judge Boudin's opinion in Lotus v. Borland, as well as the commentary excerpted earlier, there is another player whose labor now begins to count in the analysis: the user. Consumers of copyrighted works are now understood to make significant investments in learning them, and in building up libraries of material that are compatible only with the protected work. The heavy emphasis on the spreadsheet "macros" users create in the Lotus 1-2-3 format bears this out. It is the user's efforts, the user's investments of time, that are here the subject of the legal inquiry. The labor theory has thus come full circle: instead of creators being protected against rapacious users (i.e., competitors), users must be protected against rapacious creators.
The user-labor concept is poorly articulated, partly because it is so new. But one primary thread can be identified across the disparate cases: an inchoate sense of the potential for user "holdups" at the hands of the owners of standards. This "user holdup" 11 thread is barely discernible, but potentially quite powerful (not to mention interesting).
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So it is very much worthwhile to tease it out of the cases and describe where it might be headed.
Preventing "User Holdup": Counterleverage for Users
The obligations; an analogy would be to the rule of "impossibility of performance" or "frustration of purpose" in contract law, which relieves a promising party of his or her obligation to perform when an unforeseen event makes performance pointless (e.g., paying rent for a building that has burned down).
Finally, the law may concern itself in these instances as much with distributional concerns as with questions of allocational efficiency. Put another way, assume a standard owner executes a latent holdup threat, and that this is foreseeable to users. We can assume in this instance that users are better off even after being held up (e.g., by monopoly pricing in a later period) than they would have been if they had never purchased the standardized technology in the first place. If the law nonetheless calls for intervention under these circumstances, it must be based on the notion that it is unfair for the supplier to reap where it has not sown. The idea -again, commonplace in various corners of intellectual property such as the "misappropriation" doctrine -is that the law serves to enforce norms of fairness, in addition to its role as purveyor of efficiencyenhancing rules of behavior. While normally applied in favor of the creator of certain kinds of works not otherwise protectable by intellectual property law, there is no reason in principle why the same impulse cannot be made to serve the benefit of users. The thought might be that, beyond a certain level of reward, giving rights to the creator of a work no longer advances incentives to an appreciable degree. At this point, especially
where users have invested significant time and energy in the cultivation of standardspecific works of their own, the law might well favor the user.
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The objections to a distributional role for legal rules are well-known; indeed, they served as one of the early rallying points for the law and economics movement. 19 In the particular case of intellectual property, one objection that suggests itself immediately can be stated in terms of tournament theory. While a wildly successful work may appear to provide rewards far in excess of what it in some sense "deserves," the very existence of inordinately large rewards may serve as a powerful incentive for many other would-be creators and innovators. My point here is therefore not that distributional issues can necessarily be introduced in a simple, clearcut way. It is only that as a positive statement, there are distributional currents in the law of intellectual property that may well manifest themselves eventually in the emerging law of standards and interoperability.
Having developed the notion of user holdup, and of interoperability in general, we must now consider whether it might be applied to standards covered by patents.
Patent Law and Interoperability
To date, copyright has been at the center of the caselaw on interoperability.
Increasingly, however, firms are obtaining patents on various components of software programs. The tortured progress of the idea of software patents need not be reviewed here. Today, software inventions are patentable, period. The surest sign of this is that we are beginning to see patent cases involving software that do not even mention the question of patentable subject matter. 20 Indeed, we have moved on to new frontiers: the issue of the day in this respect is now whether "business concepts" (such as 16 Priceline.com) can be patented -and again, the answer (largely by default) appears to be "yes."
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And so the question arises: as legal protection for software expands from copyright to patent, will patent law adopt or evolve pro-interoperability rules, as copyright has? In preceding sections, I reviewed certain doctrines in copyright law that can be read as in some general sense favoring the diffusion of "standards," conceived broadly. It must be pointed out, however, that an important principle animating these doctrines is that neither copyright nor trademark law should be permitted to usurp the domain of patents. In copyright, this principle is codified in the statute. It is no less important in trademark law, where it is recognized directly in the caselaw (e.g., in the rule that "functional" aspects of products may not receive trademark protection) and indirectly in the statute (e.g., by way of a functionality objection to an attempt to register a trademark).
The prohibition on "backdoor patents" marks patents out as a special domain in intellectual property law. This raises an obvious question: are the various doctrines that constitute the pro-interoperability trend limited to copyright and trademark? In other words, are they aspects of the general policy against extending non-patent intellectual property rights into the domain of functional technology, which is reserved exclusively for patent law? If so, then these rules might well fit less well into the fabric of patent law.
This is certainly one plausible reading of the cases. But another reading, looking beyond the surface of the doctrine, is also possible. There are some plausible reasons to believe that at least some degree of interoperability might make sense as a general policy throughout intellectual property law. On this reading, statements distinguishing patent law in cases limiting copyrights are pure dictum, trotted out only to make interoperability seem a less drastic result. They distinguish patent law from their holdings, without in any way actually limiting the applicable rules in patent cases.
This is a plausible reading of non-patent cases, for the time being at least, for the simple reason that it has not yet come up. It is interesting to ask why not. Even though software patents are new, many important hardware markets are characterized by the same dynamic of network externalities and thus strategically important standards. All sorts of products, particularly consumer electronics, involve standards: everything from CD players to modems to cell phones. Why haven't any of these technologies yet produces a challenge to patentees, putting squarely before us the issue of whether a policy favoring interoperability makes sense even in the face of patents?
The primary reason is that patents, unlike copyrights, often cover only a single component or feature of an overall product. In other words, there is a less than perfect mapping from a patent onto a product space; a single patent is rarely coextensive with an economic market. Although the simple presence of a patent is sometimes said to confer monopoly power, it is now usually understood that this is not necessarily so.
Moreover, in the case of the important consumer electronics products just listed, multiple, rivalrous firms own patents covering various components of the overall product.
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From a business perspective, this means firms must often work together to set a standard. They must deal with each other to be able to sell a viable product. 
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This is not to say that a single entity will never have patent rights that cover a product with standards characteristics; indeed, the prospect of such a situation is discussed in a later section. I merely point out that the nature of technology-intensive R&D seems to lead most often to interleaving component-based innovation. Indeed, the very richness of the institutional and legal frameworks for patent bargaining illustrate how common it is that multiple firms must get together to integrate various state-of-theart components to constitute a standard. adoption of a standard may produce the "tipping" effect described above, bringing the rest of the industry into line. Private standard-setting organizations are more efficient than government organizations in several respects. Because they are more market-oriented, they are less likely than their government counterparts to settle on an inefficient standard. If they do choose an inefficient standard, it may be less entrenched than an equivalent government standard, since private standards are potentially subject to "leapfrogging." Significantly, private group standard-setting may also be more efficient than de facto standardization, since having multiple companies participating in a standard means that those companies can compete to offer products incorporating the standard after it is selected, thus expanding output and lowering prices.
Interoperability by Agreement: Standard-Setting Organizations

Standards and Patent Pools
Recent antitrust enforcement policy has begun to reflect the argument that patent pooling can confer net social gains. I have explored elsewhere how those gains come about, out of a background of strong property rights and high transaction costs. 28 I have also tried to show that patent pools are in no sense unique --that, to the contrary, they are illustrative of a whole family of transactional institutions based around intellectual property rights.
A recent example of a patent pool in the service of a standard involves the will manufacture products to meet the MPEG-2 standard.
The MPEG-2 pool has the following features common in other pools I have studied:
• "One-stop shopping" for patent/technology inputs into manufaturing • An institutional structure reflecting weighted representation among patentees;
• Expert administrative valuation procedures for (1) determining royalty splits among members and (2) "blanket" licensing charges to licensees; • A negotiation framework for determining whether new technologies merit addition to the pool; and • A pre-agreed procedure for settling disputes.
MPEG-2 is an institution, as opposed to a simple one-time transfer of rights. It has a governance structure and a set of internal rules (codified in a formal "charter" .00 times the greater number of inputs or outputs. Thus, for example, the royalty due from a film studio on a DVD disc sold to consumers incorporating a single "MPEG-2 Video Event" would be $.04, or .16% of the retail price, assuming a price of $25.00. If the disc incorporates a patent of each essential patent holder where the disc is manufactured or sold, the gross pro rata royalty for each essential patent holder would be $.0044, not considering any applicable taxes and licensing costs. The royalty due from a camcorder manufacturer which incorporates both an encoder and decoder would be $6, or .15% of the retail price, assuming a price of $400. If the camcorder incorporates a patent of each essential patent holder where the unit is manufactured or sold, the gross pro rata royalty for each essential patent holder would be $.67, not including any applicable taxes and licensing costs.
23 appropriate for inclusion in the pool. 34 (To give some sense of the complexity involved, the MPEG lawyers began by studying over 8,000 patent abstracts, owned by over 100 companies and inventors; narrowed the field to 800 patents, and eventually identified the 27 Essential Patents, most of which also have foreign counterparts.) 35 New patents are being added all the time as they are being granted by patent offices around the world. 36 If so, there is a mechanism for recalibrating the internal royalty split among members in light of the new technology. 37 This is an example of an internal "liability rule," i.e., a set of rules 34 The licensors' request for a Business Review from DOJ says: [E] xtreme care has been taken to insure that the proposed licensing program includes only blocking or essential patents and a structure has been devised both to remove from the program any patents hereafter shown to be non-essential and to include at a later date any other patents that are deemed essential. for that of the courts. This effectively converts members' property rights from "property rule" entitlements to administratively-determined liability rule entitlements.
In some sense, the prevalence of standard-setting and pooling show the reduced threat of a single dominant property right in contemporary markets. Thus these arrangements suggest a diminished chance that we must inevitably face a clash of the magnitude of the Charles River Bridge case. At the same time, standard-setting and pooling provide a potentially useful template to guide policy. If the legal system ever does confront a head-on clash between property rights and innovation, courts could turn to private standard-setting and pooling arrangements as a useful remedial model. Unlike the established (though almost forgotten) remedy of compulsory licensing, a standards/pooling-oriented remedy would require careful thought in setting the terms of participation for a patentee subject to the remedy.
Doctrinal Sources
To summarize the foregoing: patents must often be integrated for a standard to be established; and antitrust law has shown some sensitivity to the social welfare gains that can flow when this integration is achieved through a private institutional framework for inter-firm bargaining.
$25,000 for certain start-up expenses which the original licensors incurred (Articles 2, 6).
There is a cap on the upward revision of royalty rates over the short term, however:
The Portfolio License expires in 2000, but each licensee is given the option to renew the license for an additional period of five years (Art. 6.1). Licensees are assured that royalties will increase, if at all, by no more than 25% for the five year renewal period.
DOJ Business Review Letter, supra.
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Still, there is always the possibility that a firm will acquire a broad, pioneering patent that in effect covers a technological standard. Short of this, control over a standard may be achieved through a portfolio of related patents, some of which may be acquired from independent firms. Should this occur, and should questions arise about the effects of the patent(s) on interoperability, the legal system will have to decide whether the general principle of the copyright cases should be imported into patent law. property law could provide a built-in mechanism to achieve interoperability with an industry standard.
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As a general proposal, this seems coherent enough. Yet still one feels the need to find some doctrinal support for such a radical proposal. Putting aside the traditional (though long-overlooked) antitrust remedy of compulsory licensing, where within intellectual property is there precedent for such an approach?
Patent Misuse
A good starting place is the doctrine of patent misuse. Some patent misuse cases seem to at least speak the language of the "disproportionate leverage" principle of the copyright cases reviewed earlier. If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to debilitating uncertainty.
Despite these doubts, and despite recent legislation further constraining the doctrine, 42 patent misuse survives as an odd but stubborn variant of antitrust law. The § 271. Infringement of patent ....
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a Federal Circuit continues to hew to the older cases, notwithstanding criticism from antitrust quarters. 43 And although Judge Posner was no doubt being facetious when he suggested that a continuing role for the doctrine could be justified if it were read as "condemn[ing] any patent licensing practice that is even trivially anticompetitive, at least if it has no socially beneficial effects," 44 he may in fact be on to something. There may be a separate role for misuse, related to but apart from mainstream antitrust law. Indeed, formulating the issue as one of "impermissible" patent scope calls to mind the heavily policy-laden series of doctrines by which patent law calibrates an inventor's property right according to the magnitude of his or her contribution, the prospect of follow-on inventions, and other factors. 45 Seen from this perspective, the law of misuse could easily adopt the promotion of interoperability, at least at the margin, as one of its animating policies.
To clarify the potential role that patent misuse might serve, consider a hypothetical variant on a recent tying case decided under misuse law. 46 Imagine a firm separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned. format. In response, Fluid "reverse engineers" DCI's compression software, in an attempt to rework Fluid's streaming technology so it works more effectively with the DCI format.
In the process, Fluid infringes DCI's patent. DCI sues for patent infringement. 47 adding the "market power" requirement for misuse/tying cases, applied to tie-outs as well as tie-ins. 47 Even if the version of Fluid's product that is offered for sale does not infringe DCI's compression patent, Fluid necessarily had to "make and use" DCI's technology, without DCI's authorization, in the course of the reverse engineering process. Hence there was patent infringement, and arguably DCI could enjoin all sales of Fluid's DCI-compatible streaming product. To re-emphasize an earlier point: there is no "fair use" defense in patent law. In theory anyway, once infringement is established, that is the end of the analysis.
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An antitrust counterclaim by Fluid would encounter a number of problems: Although the Insulin and hGH Agreements grant Lilly and Kabi, respectively, both unpatented materials and patented technology, we do not believe this sufficiently distinguishes the instant case from others in which per se patent misuse historically has been found. It is clear that Genentech's contractual right to terminate the agreements should the licensees sell recombinant insulin or hGH for which Genentech receives no royalty includes the right to cancel the patent license of the licensee. The retention of such a right appears to use the patent as leverage to insure that the licensee will not use the microorganisms and the technology of competitors. This type of tying arrangement previously has been condemned as per se patent misuse. Moreover, the fact that the provisions are rights to terminate rather than such a court might rely on is the relationship between DCI's patent and the markets for data compression formats and streaming technology. In deciding on the legitimacy of DCI's attempt to use its data compression format to advantage its streaming technology, a court might well be influenced by the significance of the patented component of the compression format. It is at least relevant in a misuse analysis -aimed, you will recall, at deciding whether the patentee "impermissibly broadened" its patent -whether the patented technology was a major contribution or simply a routine component-level invention. If the latter, courts might fall back on well-accepted jurisprudence regarding patent scope. Under this law, non-pioneering inventions receive a lesser degree of protection than pioneering ones.
Applied this way, patent misuse mirrors some of the caselaw on the "doctrine of equivalents." 51 In addition, it begins to reflect more explicitly some of the same concerns that have permeated software copyright cases for the last decade. In short, misuse begins to look like a proper vehicle for resolving -with due sensitivity to the nature of patents, and again at the margins -issues of interoperability in a world of networks and standards.
explicit prohibitions on the licensees' use of competitors' products does not lessen their impact.
The court went on to hold, however, that the license agreement should be scrutinized in light of the 1988 amendements to the Patent Act, which require market power in the tying and patented product. See also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.), rehearing denied, 161 F.3d 1380 (1998) (upholding jury verdict on uncontested instruction that it was misuse to change the design of an unpatented biopsy needle kit with the intent to render competitors' designs for unpatented needle components incompatible there is support, from at least some quarters, for an expansion of the interoperability notion at least partially into the domain of patents.
The "Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents"
I stated earlier that there is no "fair use" principle in patent law. This is not quite
true. An obscure doctrine called "reverse equivalents" is a colorable approximation.
Under this doctrine, a literal infringer whose technology is "so far changed in principle" as compared to the patentee's is let off the hook. One problem with the doctrine is that it has not been used, outside the law reviews, in over 100 years. Another is that it is a frightening anomaly, with seemingly little support in the overall fabric or history of patent law. And finally, it has been somewhat of a "darling" of academics -a surefire recipe for obscurity in patent law.
Having said all this, it should be noted that the doctrine has been recognized, though not applied, in a number of recent cases. 53 Furthermore, it has been explained as a I argue that neither the copyright laws nor the patent laws preclude duplication of protected program features, including "lock" and "key" features, to whatever extent necessary to achieve full compatibility with an unpatented computer system. . . . mechanism that could be brought to bear in the much-studied dynamic between pioneer inventors and improvers. 54 To be specific, I have proposed that even a modest threat that an infringer will be let go, free of liability, would have a salutary effect on pioneerimprover bargaining where the pioneer's patent is used as a "holdup" right to extract significant rents from a "radical improver."
55
It is impossible to predict whether a court would be bold enough to apply these ideas in an actual case. At the same time, it is useful to keep in mind one general point from this literature: that doctrines limiting property rights can exert an important influence at the margin on parties deciding whether or not to voluntarily license patented technologies. We return to this "bargaining in the shadow of legal rules" point a few paragraphs later.
Analogy: Partial Genericide in Trademark Law
As presented here, patent misuse and "reverse equivalents" can be restated as follows: if you are successful enough -if you invent a technology that becomes a standard -we will take away your property right. This is about the starkest and most radical statement of the principle possible. Yet stating it this way allows us to see that indeed there is a corollary in intellectual property: the rule of "genericide" in trademark law, which says that you lose your trademark when it attains widespread use as a general product descriptor. Unlike total genericide, which results in the complete loss of [T]he plaintiff has no monopoly on the use of the word "Cola" in the name of its beverage. It has been held that the word is generic and therefore may be used in the name of a cola drink by any one who chooses to make such a beverage.
The remarkable aspect of genericide is that trademark rights are lost despite the best efforts of the mark's originator to prevent it. The word at issue, originally chosen because it was distinctive, passes into the public domain through countless acts of private, uncontrolled use. Often, the process occurs because the trademarked term was so This aspect of genericide comes through strongly in the following passage from another of the Coca-Cola cases, which begins by recognizing that the Coca-Cola
Company originated popular use of the term "cola":
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[I]t is important to inquire whether or not the word "cola" has a descriptive significance apart from its use in the trade-mark Coca-Cola, and has become a generic term, generally used to indicate a class of beverage. The answer is to be found, we believe, in scientific and popular literature, [and] in the discussions of The court then turned to the question of trademark protection for the term "cola": 60 It is true that the name identifies the goods of the plaintiff, but it has also come to characterize them. This process has been hastened by the fact that the combination of extract of coca leaves and extract of cola nuts employed by Pemberton was new, and it gave to the product a new and distinctive flavor for which there was no other name than that which he employed. Hence the drink came to be known to the public by this name . . . The process was further stimulated by the great public response to the drink and the activities of numerous competitors who speedily entered the field and were enabled lawfully to make the same or a similar beverage, since Coca-Cola was not covered by a patent.
59 117 F.2d 352, 355.
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Next the court considered the legal significance of the fact that "cola" had come to be used by the public to refer to a class of soft drinks, rather than specifically to Coca-Cola:
The adoption of the word "cola" to characterize a class of drinks thus came about very naturally, to some extent with the consent of the Coca-Cola Company . . . and to a greater extent because in the course of events it could not be prevented.
It was attended by a vast increase after 1886 in the literature relating to the cola nut and its uses. Publications of various types recognized the fact that it could be used as an ingredient of a soft drink. Numerous references to the cola nut and to cola syrup and extract and their use in beverages, called cola drinks, appeared throughout the following years in dictionaries, encyclopedias, pharmaceutical magazines, trade journals and government publications. During the same period the word was adopted as part of the trade name of a large number of competing beverages.
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Finally, the court considers the legal importance of Coca-Cola's role as originator of the term, as well as its efforts to prevent use of "cola" in a generic sense:
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No reported case has come to our attention which distinctly holds that the word "cola" cannot be used as part of a name of a beverage provided that the whole name is not confusingly similar to Coca-Cola. It is urged, however, that we should make such a decision in this case for the reasons, which found favor in the It might seem that the notion of genericide does not make much sense. Why should a mark pass into the public domain because it has come to signify a category of products rather than a single product/source combination? Where the trademark owner "invents" the trademark, there is a clear sense in which the genericness doctrine takes away some rights that the creator was endowed with because of her creativity.
Genericide thus seems in conflict with the basic premises of trademark law; it attempts a rough "calibration," along the lines of patent and copyright, to adjust the incentive to call forth the optimum (or at least desirable) level of this activity, rather than providing a permanent, blanket incentive.
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In some ways, genericide is analogous to the argument that copyright protection on a software user interface should "lapse" when the interface becomes a standard. 64 The unifying theme is the notion that the success of certain kinds of creative works is largely 63 Cf. 71 Consider the example of "Yo-Yo". How would you describe one without using the word itself? Perhaps: "rotating toy on a string"? Or, as an alternative, perhaps one requiring some explanation, "wheel on a string"? The crying need for a simple term to describe the toy no doubt accounts for the fact that "yo-yo" has now "gone generic." 72 And this example shows the common sense behind genericide. Yo-yo, a good term to describe the toy, becomes widely adopted as the standard way to refer to it. Each "adoption" decision, standing in isolation, is trivial; but in the aggregate, there is an appreciable collective investment. Dictionaries are revised, toy company catalogues are printed, and, most importantly, millions upon millions of English speakers learn that the word "yo-yo" applies to a certain type of toy on a string. 73 As each speaker "adopts" the word, its value grows: subsequent speakers know that once they learn it, they can speak cogently about this type of toy to all the other English speakers who already know it. In the process, yo-yo becomes a common term with a unique referent, viz., that particular type of toy. In short, it becomes a standard linguistic descriptor. The same occurs each time a well-chosen term becomes generic under the law of trademarks. 74 The cost of reversing the use of the term as a generic product descriptor is obviously very high. This explains why, to prevent genericide, firms often spend a good deal of money on "educational" advertising (e.g., "There is no such thing as a Xerox.") 75 Such expenditures show that the cost of informing the public about alternative product descriptors is worth it to the firm, given its investment in its trademark. 76 Of course, it may be impossible for a company to prevent genericide, for example, when a trademark achieves rapid and overwhelming acceptance. 77 Then no amount of policing will work.
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to show up in the dictionary than those held not to be generic, the difference in probabilities is small--54% versus 41%.").
Such rapid acceptance indicates that the next best alternative descriptor is significantly less effective.
To be sure, some alternative terms are better than others. "Lip balm," as an alternative to "CHAP STICK," works fairly well, while "dextro-amphetimine sulphate," is a poor alternative to "DEXADRINE." 79 One commentator advocates a crosselasticities of demand analysis to determine the degree of substitutability between terms, to be used in genericide analyses. 
Problems with the Genericide Analogy
The basic problem with the genericide analogy is one we saw earlier in the discussion of interoperability in copyright law. Before one imports concepts from trademark into patent law, one must confront the argument that many of the limitations of trademark law are built in to prevent trademarks from becoming "backdoor patents."
Thus, the limitations of trademark may have no place in patent law.
The prohibition on trademarks as "backdoor patents" is expressed nicely in the following passage from the famous (well, to IP lawyers anyway) "shredded wheat" case, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. 81 Justice Brandeis set out a classic discussion of "genericide," though one infused also with elements of functionality and descriptiveness/secondary meaning:
The plaintiff has no exclusive right to the use of the term "Shredded Wheat" as a trade name. For that is the generic term of the article, which describes it with a fair degree of accuracy; and is the term by which the biscuit in pillow-shaped form is generally known by the public. Since the term is generic, the original maker of the product acquired no exclusive right to use it. As Kellogg Company had the right to make the article, it had, also, the right to use the term by which the public knows it. . . . Ever since 1894 the article has been known to the public as shredded wheat. For many years, there was no attempt to use the term "Shredded Wheat" as a trade-mark. . . .
Moreover, the name "Shredded Wheat," as well as the product, the process and the machinery employed in making it, has been dedicated to the public. The basic patent for the product and for the process of making it, and many other patents for special machinery to be used in making the article, issued to Perky. In those patents the term "shredded" is repeatedly used as descriptive of the product.
The basic patent expired October 15, 1912; the others soon after. Since during the life of the patents "Shredded Wheat" was the general designation of the patented product, there passed to the public upon the expiration of the patent, not only the right to make the article as it was made during the patent period, but also the right to apply thereto the name by which it had become known.
ultimate goal of a "pro-interoperability" principle in patent law ought to be encouraging private bargaining. Ideally, such a doctrine would strongly encourage patentees who might otherwise "go it alone" on the strength of their patent(s) to join a voluntary standard-setting organization and/or patent pool, or at least license widely. Then the exchange-governance-coordination mechanisms described earlier would apply to the patentee in question, relieving some of the tension of the property rights/competition tradeoff. Again ideally, the result would be a world where, in effect, the owner of the Charles River Bridge negotiated a graceful entry strategy for a firm wishing to compete in part of the incumbent's market, but cooperate in other respects (e.g., by giving advance notice in the event bridge service would close one of the bridges, or figuring out ways to reduce congestion in peak-traffic periods).
Of course, such cooperation is not inevitable. In fact, where the rules are unclear (or nonexistent!) it is very unlikely. Early test cases are the norm, because before parties can cooperate they must know their legal rights, which play a large part in determining their reservation prices. And perhaps, by the time the ground rules are set, conditions will change and a new competitive dynamic will ensue. But, since individual cases must be decided anyway, it's best to do so on the assumption that today's holding will set tomorrow's incentives for various prospective future litigants.
division obscures the titular boundary between "buyer" and "seller." More precisely, endowing each bargainer with a share of the underlying entitlement creates the possibility of two different types of Coasean trade: A bargainer might buy the other party's claim, or, alternatively, she might sell her own. During negotiation, each party is likely to be uncertain about whether she will ultimately emerge as a seller or a buyer. This strategic "identity crisis" can strongly mitigate each party's incentive to misrepresent her respective valuation; each party must balance countervailing interests in shading up her valuation, as one would qua seller, and shading down her valuation, as one would qua buyer. This form of rational ambivalence, we argue, can lead the bargainers to represent their valuations more truthfully. 
Conclusion
Much of the preceding will sound vague and mushy to many readers. So let me recap my approach, and explain the soft-headed tone.
I began with a discussion of the Charles River Bridge case because it embodies one of the great clashes of economic interests and principles of its day. The case may be defended on any of a number of grounds: doctrine, economics, and so on. But ultimately it is understood as the embodiment of an economic policy or vision. It is in some sense ineluctably political, a statement of the Jacksonian worldview.
Today, or very soon at any rate, the contemporary incarnation of the issues presented in Charles River Bridge will play themselves out against the backdrop of intellectual property law. Now the cornerstone economic assets are increasingly information products of one sort or another, together with the property rights that cover them. The powerful dynamics of standards-driven markets create tensions between incumbent firms, with their installed bases and property rights portfolios, and the users of technology, together with would-be entrants who want access to the standard. The tension is likely to be resolved on the basis of economic policy, or a vision of what our basic principles should mean for competition in the software industry. There is inevitably a political dimension to such decisions; it is thus probably irrelevant whether considering allocational efficiency in isolation could resolve the issues. In this paper I have tried to discern some doctrinal bases courts might draw upon in resolving the important questions ahead. Some, such as copyright and patent misuse, are old. Others, such as the notion of "technological genericide," are novel. But I have also argued that more important than the technical doctrine are the concepts that underlie it. Just as deep concepts in the dominant legal regime of the nineteenth century -corporate law, contracts, and the constitution -held the key to resolving the formative Charles River Bridge case, the ascending regime of intellectual property law makes available the raw materials out of which we can build workable solutions to the coming clashes.
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At the same time, it is well to remember that there are limits to the flexibility of our doctrines and principles. One important limitation that has grown more prominent in recent years is the constitional law of "takings." Indeed, in the very case with which we began, Charles River Bridge, Justice Story in dissent sounded a very modern theme indeed in condemning the "flexible," Jacksonian majority:
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Although the sovereign power in free governments may appropriate all the property, public as well as well as private, for public purposes, making compensation therefor; yet it has never been understood, at least, never in our republic, that the sovereign power can take the private property of A. and give it to B., by the right of 'eminent domain;' or, that it can take it at all, except for public purposes; or, that it can take it for public purposes, without the duty and responsibility of making compensation for the sacrifice of the private property of one, for the good of the whole. These limitations have been held to be fundamental axioms in free governments like ours; and have accordingly received the sanction of some of our most eminent judges and jurists.
This is an important reminder. Though the clash between public purpose and private property will require some updating of our property rules, it may also occasion innovations in the law of takings. In so doing, we may well have to learn not only how to limit this new form of property, but how (and when) to "limit these [new] limits" as well.
84 420 U.S. at 642 (Story, J., dissenting).
